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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in
S&P firms.
The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the
S&P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance
mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and
details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to
the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities,
the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in
governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance.
In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace
him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market
using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive
compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1)
a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3)
a bigger tournament prize.

In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is

strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to
proxy for internal labor market competition.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing, etc.) have sparked
renewed interest from researchers and investors alike. In the first part of my dissertation, I
examine how governance mechanisms change for firms being added to the S&P 500 index. I
find that governance improves after being added to the index. Using a novel measure of
governance improvements, I find that the market reacts positively to governance improvements.
Also, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance.
In the second part, I examine issues related to CEO successions with another novel
measure, competition index.

Using the competition index to capture the concentration of

executive compensation levels, I find that a more competitive internal labor market is associated
with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO
turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover
relationship is strengthened by a more competitive internal labor market.
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CHAPTER 2
GOVERNANCE CHANGES FOR FIRMS ADDED TO THE S&P 500
2.1 Introduction
Companies to be included in the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) index are selected
by the Index Committee and a team of analysts and economists at Standard and Poor’s. The
potential companies have to distinguish themselves in order to gain membership. Membership in
the S&P 500 index provides a certain level of prestige to its members. However, little is known
about what happens after a firm is added.
One stream of research focuses on interim performance and reports that the market reacts
favorably to firms following index inclusion (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Beneish
and Whaley, 2002). Another stream of research centers on long-term performance. They
provide evidence of superior permanent performance post-addition (Lynch and Mendenhall,
1997; Kaul et al., 2000; Blume and Edelen, 2001). While prestige and “certification” can be
used to explain the transitory price effect (Jain, 1987; Kappou et al., 2008), the justification for
the permanent price effect is quite mixed. Gompers et al. (2003) provide evidence on the
governance-performance relationship. In this study, I conjecture that changes in governance
mechanisms following index inclusion may help explain the persistence in firm operating
performance.
The importance of governance has gained renewed interest in recent literature, especially
with the outburst of corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, Global Crossing, Worldcom) and the passing
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Coates, 2007; Switzer, 2007; Chang and Sun, 2009). Recent
research highlights the importance of corporate governance. In their 1997 paper, Shleifer and
2

Vishny stated that, “the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical importance.”
In a more recent paper, Gillan (2006) re-emphasizes the importance of corporate governance.
Klapper and Love (2004) find that governance matters, especially in countries with weak legal
environments.

Fisman et al. (2005) show that governance plays an important role in the

performance-dismissal relationship.
For firms added to an index, governance structures change significantly. Research has
shown that institutional investors increase their holdings in firms that are being added to the
index (Pruitt and Wei, 1989; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Shankar and Miller, 2006). A
similar trend is found for analyst coverage as well (Liang et al., 2008; Yu, 2008). These changes
will likely impact current or future performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004;
Bhagat and Bolton, 2008).
In this study, I extend this literature by taking a more comprehensive look at how
governance changes following additions. Specifically, I examine eight monitoring mechanisms
both individually and in aggregate. The aggregate approach is designed to capture the notion
that monitoring mechanisms may be substitutes or complements (Rediker and Seth, 1995;
Florackis, 2005). Thus, considering governance as a whole gives a more comprehensive picture
of how governance changes. Mechanisms examined in this study include the Governance Index
(G-Index), Entrenchment Index (E-Index), institutional ownership, management ownership,
blockholders’ ownership, duality, board size, and proportion of outsiders on a board. I also
create an Improvement Index, a collection of improvements in governance mechanisms, to gauge
the overall changes in governance.

3

I find governance mechanisms improve after firms are added to the S&P 500 index. All
governance mechanisms (except management ownership and blockholders’ ownership) exhibit
an improvement post-addition.

To see how the market reacts in response to changes in

governance mechanisms, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are regressed on the various
governance mechanisms. The results suggest that changes in institutional ownership have a
significant impact. In addition, I find a positive and significant coefficient for the Improvement
Index, suggesting that the market views governance improvements as good news. Finally, I find
that governance improvements are positively related with operating performance improvements.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways.

First, prior research on

governance focuses on subsets of mechanisms. This paper acknowledges the fact that firms have
the ability to choose among different governance mechanisms and examines a collection of
governance mechanisms. Using a novel measure, I offer a different perspective for examining
governance issues. Second, this paper provides an alternative explanation to the long-term
performance persistence. Third, I show that being added to the S&P 500 affects a firm’s overall
governance structure. Specifically, monitoring is increased, which may be consistent with the
increased public scrutiny of firms in the index.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
literature review and the hypotheses. The data and sample construction are then discussed,
followed by a discussion of the results. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
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2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
The S&P 500 index is considered a bellwether for the American economy and widely
regarded as the best single gauge of the U.S. equities market (Standard and Poor’s, 2009). In
order to be included in this index, potential firms have to first meet seven eligibility criteria 1: (1)
domicile, (2) market capitalization of $3.5 billion or more, (3) public float of at least 50%, (4)
four consecutive quarters of positive as-reported earnings, (5) contribute to sector balance
maintenance, (6) adequate liquidity and reasonable price, and (7) company type. Then, firms
have to be selected for inclusion by the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Index Committee, a team of
economists from S&P and index analysts. Hence, firms in the index as well as firms to be
included enjoy some level of prestige.

Being selected for inclusion also conveys positive

information about the prospects and longevity of that firm and thus provides “certification” to
potential investors (Jain, 1987; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Kappou et al., 2008).
Numerous studies have found positive announcement returns for firms to be included to
an index (Harris and Gurel, 1986; Shleifer, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Graham and Pirie,
1994; Beneish and Whaley, 2002; Chen et al., 2004) 2 .

In addition, prior studies have

demonstrated that firms exhibit superior long-term performance following index inclusion
(Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Kaul et al., 2000; Blume and Edelen, 2001; Madhavan, 2003;
Chen et al., 2004; Platikanova, 2008). However, the explanation for this persistence is mixed.
Chen et al. (2004) argue that the permanent price effect is due to an increase in investor
awareness while Platikanova (2008) asserts that it is due to an improvement in earnings quality.

1

For details on the eligibility criteria, see the Standard and Poor’s website (http:// standardandpoors.com).
Not all announcements for additions convey positive information. Firms may be added to the index due to
corporate restructuring such as mergers, acquisitions, etc.

2
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I propose that governance structures of firms added to the index will improve, which may lead to
long-term performance persistence.
In terms of performance, several studies document permanent price increases following
index inclusion (Kaul et al., 2000; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002; Brooks et al., 2004). Brooks
et al. (2004) examine the long-run performance of stocks added to the S&P 500 index. Using
different time intervals up to 180 trading days after inclusion, they find stock price increases and
the prices do not reverse. They conclude that stock performance improves for firms after index
inclusion. Using a simple model of demand curves for stocks, Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)
argue that since individual stocks do not have perfect substitutes, risk-averse arbitrageurs have to
bear additional risk and thus will take trade less aggressively. They show that mean cumulative
abnormal returns for added stocks do not reverse within 20 trading days and their findings
support the notion that demand curves for stocks slope downwards. Using realized earnings per
share (EPS), Denis et al. (2003) show that firms added to the S&P 500 index outperform peer
firms and argue that index inclusion is not an information-free event.
The performance improvement phenomenon is not only limited to the United States.
Kaul et al. (2000) examine firms in the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300 index to test whether
demand curves for stocks slope downwards. They argue that unlike using the S&P 500, the TSE
300 redefining event is information free and allow them to segregate the price pressure effects.
They show that stock prices did not reverse even as trading volume returned to normal and find
support for downward sloping demand curves for stocks.
Studies have shown that firms encounter noticeable governance changes after being
added to an index. Pruitt and Wei (1989) examine actual changes in institutional holdings and
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find that additions to the S&P 500 index are associated with increases in institutional holdings.
Hegde and McDermott (2003) also find that institutional investors increased their holdings
following S&P 500 index addition. In another S&P 500 study, Chen et al. (2004) report that
both the number of institutions and institutional holdings increase after firms are added to the
index. An increase in institutional holdings has also been observed in firms added to the Russell
2000 index (Biktimirov et al., 2004) and S&P 600 index (Shankar and Miller, 2006).
In addition, firms added were found to draw more analyst attention. Analysts typically
begin or increase their coverage of included firms in order to generate trading in these stocks,
thereby creating awareness (Irvine, 2003). Consistent with this view, Liang et al. (2008) find
that analysts are more likely to continue or initiate coverage of a firm that has joined the S&P
500 index.
Previous research has focused on performance and/or some aspect of governance, either
on institutional investors, analyst coverage, or board characteristics.

Examining executive

compensation issues, Hartzell and Starks (2003) argue that institutional investors serve a
monitoring role. Schellenger et al. (1989) find a positive relationship between outside directors’
representation on a board and corporate performance. In an examination of seasoned equity
offerings, D’Mello et al. (2005) provide support for the monitoring hypothesis by demonstrating
a positive relation between post-issue changes in institutional ownership and long-term
performance.

Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) provide evidence showing greater institutional

ownership is associated with higher bond ratings and lower bond yields. While some studies
find support, others conclude otherwise. Using corporate takeovers as a backdrop, Duggal and
Millar (1999) do not find evidence that institutional investors enhance efficiency in the market
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for corporate control. Vance (1978) finds a positive relation between inside directors and firm
performance. In Kesner’s (1987) paper examining Fortune 500 firms, he also shows a positive
relation between the proportion of inside directors and returns to investor. Furthermore, some
papers 3 find no relationship at all. Their mixed findings are not surprising, given the fact that
their analyses examine governance mechanisms in an isolated context. This paper adopts a
universal approach by examining an array of governance mechanisms and examines how the
various governance mechanisms of S&P 500 companies have changed following their addition to
the index. Specifically, I examine eight different governance mechanisms, namely: institutional
investors, G-Index, E-Index, duality, board size, board independence, management ownership,
and blockholders’ ownership.
For institutional ownership, a change is expected following a firm’s inclusion to an index,
as suggested by earlier research (Pruitt and Wei, 1989; Hegde and McDermott, 2003; Chen et al.,
2004; Shankar and Miller, 2006). In this paper, an improvement in institutional ownership is
defined as an increase in institutional ownership, based on support from previous studies (Healy
et al., 1999; Ajinkya et al., 2003).
Board characteristics are another aspect of governance that I examine. Agency theory
suggests that it may not be in the firm’s best interest to have the CEO holding the Chairman of
the board position (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Jensen, 1993; Pi and
Timme, 1993; Chang and Sun, 2009). The rationale behind is that the CEO may become too
powerful for the board to overcome since he/she is also heading the board. Since duality is a
binary variable, an improvement in duality is defined as a reduction in duality.
3

See (Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma, 1985; Kesner, Victor, and Lamont, 1986; Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Daily and
Dalton, 1992).
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As for board size, larger boards are less effective, as evidenced by Lipton and Lorsch
(1992) and Jensen (1993). Furthermore, Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) provide
evidence that smaller boards are associated with higher firm value. For this reason, board size is
expected to decrease. However, when large institutions increase their holdings in a firm, they
may want to secure a board seat, thereby increasing the board size. I follow Lipton and Lorsch
(1992) and Jensen (1993), and define an improvement in board size as a reduction in board size.
Prior studies provide evidence on the favorable impact of outside directors to influence
firm decisions aimed at maximizing shareholder wealth. Beasley (1996) documents a negative
relationship between outside directors and likelihood of financial fraud. Fama and Jensen (1983)
indicate that outside directors, by providing expertise and monitoring services, add value to firms.
Examining the fraction of the board made up of non-officers, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) report
that firms with effective governance mechanisms are rewarded with superior bond ratings and
lower yields. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) provide evidence on the potential benefit of having
an outsider on a board by showing that the appointment of an outside director is accompanied by
significantly positively excess returns. Thus, an improvement in the proportion of outside
directors is defined as an increase in the proportion of outside directors on a board.
Some studies have focused on the monitoring function of blockholders. Park and Song
(1995) compare the year-end performance between block firms and non-block firms and find that
block firms outperform non-block firms. They attribute the performance difference to possible
monitoring by the blockholders. Shome and Singh (1995) examine the relationship between firm
value and blockholdings and find that the market reaction to announcement of block formations
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is positive. Hence, an improvement in blockholders’ ownership is defined as an increase in
blockholders’ ownership.
While some focused on blockholders, others focused on management. In their seminal
paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) lay the foundation for future work on agency issues. Using a
theoretical model, they show that a manager who owns 100 percent of the residual claims on a
firm will make decisions which maximize his utility and agency costs will be generated when the
owner-manager sells off a portion of his/her residual claims. Building on Jensen and Meckling’s
(1976) work, Ang et al. (2000) find that agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s
ownership share, providing support to the theoretical predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Similar to blockholders’ ownership, an improvement in management ownership is defined as an
increase in management ownership.
In addition to examining individual mechanisms, some studies suggest that mechanisms
may be interrelated.

Using young IPO firms, Berry et al. (2006) provide evidence that

governance mechanisms may work positively to reduce the agency costs that arises from the
decrease of managerial ownership.

In a U.K. study, Florackis (2005) demonstrate that

managerial ownership and managerial compensation work as substitute mechanisms in
mitigating agency issues. Examining multiple control mechanisms, Rediker and Seth (1995) also
provide evidence supporting the substitution hypothesis. In another U.K. study, Nikoskelainen
and Wright (2007) find that a balance of interrelated governance mechanisms is critical for value
increase in buyouts. Using a large sample of firms, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) provide
empirical evidence of interdependence among various governance mechanisms.
combine the mechanisms to examine the aggregate effect.
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Hence, I

2.3 Data and Methodology
Firms to be added to the S&P 500 index are identified from the Standard and Poor’s
website. To ensure accuracy, firms are then verified through the Wall Street Journal, New York
Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, ProQuest, and PR Newswire. The sample period
begins in 1994, which is the starting date for company filings at the Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and ends in 2007. This process yields an initial sample of 427 firms.
Additional restrictions are imposed which reduce the sample size. Not all index additions
convey valuable information for the current study. Firms that are added to the index due to
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), corporate restructuring and/or name changes were excluded
from the sample, reducing the sample size to 393. In addition, in order to calculate the excess
returns for each firm, closing price information must be available from 2 days prior to and 2 days
after the announcement date. Also, to be able to estimate the change in institutional ownership,
information on institutional ownership must be available for 2 quarters prior and 2 quarters after
the announcement date.

Firms with missing information are excluded.

The final sample

includes 347 firms (See Table 2-1).
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are used to measure the market reaction. Stock
price information is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). A firm’s
cumulative return (CRTN) is calculated as the sum of the firm’s holding period return over the 2day period. In this study, three indices are used to proxy for the market, namely the S&P 500
index, the CRSP Value-Weighted index, and the CRSP Equal-Weighted index.

Market

cumulative return (CMKTRTN) is calculated as the sum of the market’s holding period return
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over the same 2-day period. For robustness, I calculate CARs using two event windows, (0,2)
and (-1,1). The CARs over a 2-day window are calculated as the difference between the firm’s
cumulative return and the market’s cumulative return over a 2-day window, as shown below:
CARi = CRTN it − CMKTRTN t

(1)

Studies have shown that firms being added to an index exhibit positive announcement
period abnormal returns (Graham and Pirie, 1994; Beneish and Whaley, 2002). As shown in
Table 2-2, the sample CAR over the (0,2) window averages about 4.3%, with p-values less than
0.01. The CRSP Equal-Weighted Index and CRSP Value-Weighted Index are also used as
market indices to make sure the results are not driven by the choice of the market indices. The
abnormal return results relative to the CRSP Equal-Weighted and Value-Weighted indices are
qualitatively similar to those of the S&P 500.
Institutional ownership (I.O.) is defined as the ratio of total shares owned by all
institutions to the total shares outstanding (T.S.O.). Quarterly institutional holdings data and
total shares outstanding are obtained from the CDA/Spectrum Institutional Investors’ (13-F)
database and Standard and Poor’s Compustat (COMPUSTAT) database, respectively.

The

change in institutional ownership (ΔI.O.) in response to addition to the S&P 500 index is
calculated as the difference between institutional ownership in the quarter before and the quarter
after the announcement quarter:
ΔI .O. =

TotalShare sOwnedByInstitutions q +1
T .S .O.q +1

−

TotalShare sOwnedByInstitutions q −1
T .S .O.q −1

(2)

Since institutional ownership data are only available quarterly, the institutional ownership before
and after each quarter are used to allow more time for changes to materialize. For example, the
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announcement that Maxim Integrated Products was to be included in the S&P 500 index was
made on May 2, 2000. In this case, the post-institutional ownership information and preinstitutional ownership information are obtained from the quarter ending September 30, 2000
and March 31, 2000, respectively. For completeness, I also calculate change in institutional
ownership using two quarters before and two quarters after the announcement quarter. The
results are qualitatively similar.
Another aspect of governance I examine is board characteristics. Specifically, I look at
board size, proportion of outside directors on a board, and duality. Board size is the number of
directors on a corporate board. To calculate the change in board size, I obtain the board size in
the year before the inclusion and the board size in the year after the inclusion and take the
difference. The proportion of outside directors on a board is the fraction of outside/independent
directors as a percentage of the board size. Directors are classified as independent/outsiders if
they are not employees of the firm, do not have substantial business relations with the firm, are
not related to employees, or are not former employees. For the change in the proportion of
outside directors on a board, I obtain the proportion of outside directors on a board from prior the
inclusion and post-inclusion and subtract the prior from the post. Duality is defined as a firm
having the same person holding the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman of the Board
(Chair) positions. Duality takes the value 1 if the same person holds the CEO/Chair posts, and
zero otherwise. To see the change in duality, I examine the duality situation pre- and postaddition and take the difference between them. Data on board-related information were handcollected from proxy statements, available in EDGAR.
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Management ownership is defined as the total shareholdings of all senior management
and directors and is obtained from the proxy statements. To calculate the change in management
ownership, I take the difference between the pre- and post-inclusion management ownership.
Blockholders are individuals or institutions which hold a substantial stake in a corporation. A
blockholder is defined as an individual or institution holding at least 5% of the firm’s total
outstanding shares and blockholder ownership is defined as the ratio of sum of all shares owned
by all blockholders to the total shares outstanding. Information on blockholders’ holdings is
obtained from proxy statements. To measure the change in blockholders’ ownership, I subtract
the pre-addition blockholders’ ownership from the post-addition blockholders’ ownership.
The G-Index, adopted from Gompers et al. (2003), tracks 24 unique provisions covered
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), covering areas such as charter, bylaws,
takeover laws, state laws, etc. The E-Index, adopted from Bebchuk et al. (2004), is based on 6 of
the 24 provisions tracked by the G-Index and attempts to capture the extent to which
shareholders can impose their will on management. Both indexes are derived using a similar
method: one point is added for every provision that restricts shareholder rights, i.e., a lower score
implies stronger shareholder rights. To see the change in G-Index and E-Index after the firm’s
inclusion to the S&P 500 Index, I take the difference between the G-Index/E-Index values preand post-addition to the index. For example, S&P announced on May 25, 2000, that Agilent
Technologies will be added to the S&P 500 index. In this case, I would take the G-Index in 1998
(pre-addition) and 2002 (post-addition) to calculate the difference. Note that information on the

14

G-Index and E-Index are not available every year. Data on the G-Index and the E-Index are
obtained from Andrew Metrick’s 4 and Lucian Bebchuk’s 5 websites, respectively.
To measure the overall governance effect, I construct an Improvement Index (IIndex).
For each governance mechanism, I compare the pre- and post-addition values and determine
whether it has improved or not. I then identify the governance mechanisms which improved
after the inclusion and add 1 for each improvement to the IIndex. Hence, the IIndex is simply
the sum of all improved mechanisms, ranging from zero to eight. An improvement is defined as
(1) a decrease in the G-Index, (2) a decrease in the E-Index, (3) a decrease in duality, (4) a
decrease in the board size, (5) an increase in the proportion of outside directors on a board, (6) an
increase in institutional ownership, (7) an increase in management ownership, and (8) an
increase in blockholders’ ownership.
The control variables used are firm size, prior performance, growth opportunities, and
debt level. It is been widely accepted that smaller firms outperformed larger firms, commonly
referred to as the “Small Firm Effect” (Banz, 1981; Keim, 1983; Fama and French, 1992; PerezQuiros and Timmermann, 2000). Total assets are commonly used as a proxy for firm size 6 and I
use the natural logarithm of total assets in the analysis. I control for prior performance using
industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) for the prior year. Firms which perform well tend to
have better governance characteristics. As noted by Gompers et al. (2003), there is a positive
relationship between firm performance and governance. Firms are classified into industries
based on their 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Industry-adjusted ROA is

4

http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/data.html
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml
6
See Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Eisenberg et al. (1998), Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Campello (2006), etc.
5
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the firm’s ROA in excess of the median firm’s ROA in that same 2-digit SIC industry. ROA is
calculated as net income divided by total assets. Tobin’s Q is used to control for growth
opportunities. A firm’s growth opportunities are likely to impact its board composition, as
evidenced by Smith and Watts (1992) and Lehn et al. (2003). Tobin’s Q is calculated using
Chung

and

Tobin ' s _ Q =

Pruitt’s

(1994)

methodology.

Their

approximate

q

is

defined

as:

( MVE + PS + DEBT )
, where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the
TA

number of common shares outstanding; PS is the liquidating value of the firm’s outstanding
preferred stock; DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short-term assets,
plus the firm’s long-term debt; TA is the total assets of the firm. Finally, I control for leverage.
Financial leverage provides information on how much long-term debt a firm has. The level of
debt a firm has should have an impact on the firm’s future cash flows and the market’s
expectation should account for that (Campello, 2006; George and Hwang, 2010). Leverage is
the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Variables used to obtain and calculate the control
variables are obtained from COMPUSTAT.
Table 2-3 shows the summary statistics for the sample. A typical corporate board of
firms added to the S&P 500 consists of about 9 members (median), of which around two-thirds
are independent directors.

On average, blockholders hold about one-fifth of total shares

outstanding while insiders own approximately 6.3% of total outstanding shares. The mean
(median) G-Index and E-Index for the sample is 8.89 (9.00) and 2.48 (3.00), respectively. More
than 70% of the sample firms have one person serving both the CEO and Chair posts.
Institutional investors own approximately two-thirds of total shares outstanding. The average
number of governance “improvements”, as shown in the IIndex, is around 3, with a maximum of
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7. Sales for the sample average about $1.26 billion, with maximum reaching $13.6 billion.
Market capitalization for the average firm in the sample is $9.64 billion. This result is not
surprising, considering that the S&P 500 focuses on the large-cap segment of the U.S. equities
market. On average, a firm has about 16.8% of long-term debt. Industry-adjusted ROA and
Tobin’s Q average at around 1.5% and 2.679, respectively. A typical firm in the sample is
outperforming its industry peers.

2.4 Results and Discussions
To see whether there is an improvement in governance mechanisms after being added to
the S&P 500 index, I compare each mechanism before and after the addition using paired t-tests.
The results are summarized in Table 2-4. The sample shows evidence of an improvement in the
G-index, E-Index, and Duality, as denoted by a decrease in the variables. However, only Duality
is statistically significant (p-value = 0.063). Institutional presence increased over the event,
averaging 4.2%, and is statistically significant (p-value = 0.000). This result reaffirms the
findings by Pruitt and Wei (1989) and Biktimirov et al. (2004). The sample exhibits a decrease
in board size, interpreted as an improvement.

However, the decrease is not statistically

significant. The proportion of outside directors shows sign of improvement, with an average
increase of about 1.1%, and is statistically significant (p-value = 0.067).

Management

ownership and blockholders’ ownership both increased after being added to the index, but the
increases are not statistically significant. The results from the paired t-tests are not conclusive;
only 3 of the 8 governance mechanisms show improvement following inclusion to the S&P 500
index.
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To further investigate whether the governance mechanisms have improved, I examine
each mechanism in greater detail. The G-Index, E-Index, and board-related mechanisms for
quite a number of firms in the sample exhibit no change. For example, 282 out of 347 firms
show no change in duality; there are 240 and 205 firms with no change in the E-Index and the GIndex, respectively. I performed a one-sample test of proportions on each mechanism. For each
mechanism, I compare the firms which improved to those which deteriorated, excluding the
firms with no improvement/deterioration. Table 2-5 summarizes the results. With the exception
of management ownership and blockholders’ ownership, all other mechanisms show evidence of
statistically significant improvements. Approximately 66% of the firms exhibit improvements in
institutional ownership (p-value = 0.000). Similar pattern can be found on the indexes as well,
with 62% and 63.6% of the firms showing improvements in G-Index and E-Index, respectively.
Improvements on both indexes are significant. Improvement in duality can be found in 61.5% of
the firms. Firms in the sample also exhibit improvements in board size and the proportion of
outside directors.

Both reported statistically significant improvements at the 5% and 10%

significance levels, respectively.

In addition, t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are

conducted on the IIndex. The results from both tests are summarized in Table 2-6. Panel A
shows that the average IIndex is approximately 3, meaning that on average, each firm exhibits 3
governance improvements. The results from both tests conclude that the (1) mean and (2)
median of the IIndex are statistically (at 1% levels) and significantly different from zero. The
overall results from Table 2-5 suggest that improvements in governance after index inclusion are
quite widespread.
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To see whether the market reacts to changes in governance mechanisms, the following
equation was estimated:
CARi = α + β 1 ΔIOi + β 2 ΔGI i + β 3 ΔEI i + β 4 ΔNDIRi + β 5 Δ%OUTi + β 6 ΔDuality i
+ β 7 ΔMOWN i + β 8 ΔBOWN i + ψ * CONTROLS + ε i

(3)

where ΔIO is the change of institutional ownership, ΔGI is the change in the G-Index, ΔEI is the
change in the E-Index, ΔNDIR is board size, Δ%OUT is the percentage of the board members
who are outsiders, ΔMOWN is management ownership, ΔBOWN is the combined holdings of all
blockholders. The control variables include proxies for firm size, prior profitability, growth
opportunities, and leverage.
The regression results are presented in Table 2-7. Only the change in institutional
ownership is statistically significant.

The positive coefficient for institutional ownership

suggests that the market reacts positively to an increase in the change in institutional ownership.
All the other governance variables are not statistically significant.

To see if governance

mechanisms work in cohesion (rather than in isolation), the following equation was estimated:
CARi = α + β 1 IIndexi + ψ * CONTROLS + ε i

(4)

where IIndex is the improvement index. I utilize the same control variables. The results are
summarized in Table 2-8.

As expected, the market reacts positively to governance

improvements. A one unit increase in the IIndex is associated with a 0.61% increase in CARs.
To make sure this result is not driven by institutional ownership, I modify the IIndex to exclude
improvements in institutional ownership and re-run the regression. As shown in model (2), the
coefficient for IIndex is still positive and statistically significant (p-value = 0.043).
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The results from Table 2-8 suggest that improvements in governance are viewed as good
news by the market. To see whether operating performance improvement is associated with
governance mechanisms improvements, I estimate the following equation:
ΔROAi = α + β 1 ΔIOi + β 2 ΔGI i + β 3 ΔEI i + β 4 ΔNDIRi + β 5 Δ%OUTi + β 6 ΔDuality i
+ β 7 ΔMOWN i + β 8 ΔBOWN i + ψ * CONTROLS + ε i

(5)

where ΔROA is the difference between ROA of two years. For example, ROA1-3 is the ROA
difference between Years (t+1) and (t+3). All other variables are as defined earlier. The results
are summarized in Table 2-9. In three of the four specifications, the change in duality is negative
and statistically significant. As expected, the separation of the CEO/Chair position is associated
with performance improvement. In specification (2), a decrease in the board size is significantly
associated with an improvement in operating performance, consistent with Jensen (1993) and
Yermack (1996). The coefficient for management ownership is positive and also statistically
significant.
As discussed earlier, there could be some inter-dependencies among governance
mechanisms. To see whether they work together to impact operating performance, I estimate the
following equation:
ΔROAi = α + β 1 IIndexi + ψ * CONTROLS + ε i

(6)

The regression results are presented in Table 2-10.

In all four specifications, the

coefficient for the IIndex is positive and statistically significant. An improvement in governance
is associated with an improvement in operating performance.

This result suggests that

governance mechanisms could be working in cohesion rather than in isolation, which could
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reconcile some of the inconclusive results from previous studies 7 . Governance mechanisms
should not be looked upon separately, but rather as a combined effort.
In summary, I have shown that firm governance improves after being included into the
S&P 500 index. The market reacts positively to governance improvements. Also, improvement
in firm performance is positively related with governance improvements.

2.5 Robustness of Results
To make sure the results were not driven by a particular choice of variables, I conduct
additional tests on the CARs, the market indices, the proxy for firm size, and the constituents of
the IIndex.
For the CARs, besides the (0,2) window, I also calculate the CARs for the (-1,1) window.
The results are qualitatively similar to the (0,2) window. In addition, two other market indices
(CRSP value-weighted index and CRSP equal-weighted index) are used to calculate the CARs.
In this paper, the proxy used to control for firm size is total assets. Others have used
either sales (Kaul et al., 2000) or market capitalization (Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Madhavan,
2003; Yu, 2008).
Two components of the IIndex, the G-index and E-index, are highly correlated
(correlation coefficient > 0.60), and are potentially capturing the same thing. To make sure the
results are not biased due to this relation, I perform additional analyses by (1) excluding E-Index
and (2) by excluding G-index in the IIndex computation. All results are qualitatively similar
regardless of variables/proxies used and are summarized in Table 2-11.
7

See Boyd (1995), Baliga et al. (1996), Bhagat and Black (1999), Duggal and Millar (1999), Vafeas (2000), Park
and Shin (2004), Jennings (2005), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Rose (2007), etc.
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2.6 Summary and Conclusions
I examine what happens to the governance structures of firms added to the S&P 500
index.

With a sample of 347 firms, I compare the pre- and post-addition governance

mechanisms. I find that firm governance in general improves after being added to the index. In
particular, duality, the proportion of outside directors, and institutional ownership show
improvements. Further examination of the mechanisms reveals that many mechanisms do not
change over the sample period. Using a one-sample proportions test, I find that all mechanisms
(except management ownership and blockholders’ ownership) exhibit statistically significant
improvements. This is reinforced by the fact that a typical firm exhibits 3 (median) governance
improvements post-addition.
To see whether the market reacts to an improvement in governance, I conduct additional
analyses. My results show that the market reacts positively to an increase in institutional
ownership. Using governance improvements in aggregate, the relationship between the market
reaction and IIndex is positive and significant.

Hence, I conclude that the market reacts

positively to governance improvements.
I also test the relationship between governance improvements and operating firm
performance.

I find that improvements in governance are positively related to operating

performance improvement.
In summary, the results support the notion that for firms added to the S&P 500 index,
governance shows improvement and that this improvement leads to better operating performance.
Also, the impact of governance should be analyzed collectively.
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Table 2-1 Final Sample Selection
Firms are initially identified and verified through Standard and Poor’s, Wall Street
Journal, ProQuest, and PR Newswire, yielding 427 firms. 34 more firms are excluded
due to mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, and/or name changes. Some
institutional ownership data were missing from the 13-Fs. As such, 25 more firms were
excluded. An additional 11 firms were excluded due to missing data from CRSP.
Another 5 firms were excluded due to missing data from COMPUSTAT. Board
information not available from IRRC was obtained from proxy statements. 5 firms could
not be verified and were dropped. The remaining 347 firms were used as the sample for
this study.

Number of Firms
Initial Sample

427

Mergers and Acquisitions,
Corporate Restructuring, and/or

34

Name Changes
Institutional Ownership (13-F)

25

Center for Research in Security

11

Prices (CRSP)
COMPUSTAT

5

Proxy Statements

5

Final Sample

347
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Table 2-2 Cumulative Returns
The cumulative return is calculated as the sum of the daily return within the event
windows, (0,2) and (-1,1). The abnormal or excess return is simply the difference
between the cumulative return of the sample and the cumulative return of the S&P 500.
The sample size used in this study is 347 firms. P-values are reported in parenthesis.

Event Window (0,2)

Event Window (-1,1)

Sample
S&P500

0.043
-0.001

0.045
0.000

Difference

0.044
(0.000)

0.045
(0.000)
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Table 2-3 Summary Statistics
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Institutional ownership is
the total institutional holdings as a percentage of total shares outstanding. Blockholder ownership is the
combined holdings of all blockholders. Management ownership is the combined holdings of all senior
management. Board size is the total number of directors on a corporate board. Percentage outsiders is
the proportion of outside directors as a percentage of board size. A director is classified as
independent/outsiders if they are not employees of the firm, do not have substantial business relations
with the firms, are not related to employees, or are not former employees. Industry-adjusted ROA is the
difference between the firm’s ROA and the ROA of the median firm in the same industry. Tobin’s Q is
calculated using Chung and Pruitt (1994)’s methodology, as the sum of the market value of equity,
preferred equity, short-term liabilities net of short-term assets, and long term debt over total assets.
Leverage is the ratio of long term debt over total assets. Sales is net sales revenue. Market
capitalization is the market value of equity. The sample size used in this study is 347 firms.
Variables

Mean

Median

St. Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

G-Index

8.890

9

2.604

3

15

E-Index

2.484

3

1.417

0

6

Duality

0.706

1

0.456

0

1

Institutional Ownership

0.655

0.683

0.213

0.022

0.987

Blockholders’ Ownership

0.196

0.140

0.192

0

0.940

Management Ownership

0.063

0

0.086

0

0.543

Board Size

10.02

9

3.50

4
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Percentage Outsiders

0.674

0.714

0.188

0.091

0.958

Improvement Index

3.012

3

0.075

0

7

Industry-Adjusted ROA

0.015

0.011

0.035

-0.219

0.346

Tobin's Q

2.679

1.782

2.556

0.075

14.913

Leverage

0.168

0.125

0.164

0.000

0.833

Sales ($ millions)

1,260.0

679.0

1,700.0

13,600.0

35.3

Market Capitalization ($ millions)

9,640.0

6,780.0

11,600.0

116,000.0

143.0

347

347

347

347

347

# Observations
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Table 2-4 Changes in Governance Variables before and after Being Added to the S&P 500 Index
For every firm, each governance variable is collected pre- and postbeing added to the S&P 500 index. Then, the pre- and post- variables
are paired up and their means are compared. Sample size for this
analysis is 347. *** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%
and 10% levels, respectively.

Before Being
Added

After Being
Added

Diff.

t-stat

p-value

Management Ownership

0.063

0.070

0.006

1.527

0.128

Blockholders' Ownership

0.196

0.201

0.005

0.444

0.657

Duality

0.706

0.663

-0.043*

-1.867

0.063

Board Size

10.023

9.931

-0.092

-0.886

0.376

Percent Outsiders

0.663

0.674

0.011*

1.841

0.067

G-Index

8.890

8.830

-0.061

-1.106

0.270

E-Index

2.484

2.427

-0.058

-1.637

0.103

Institutional Ownership

0.655

0.697

0.042***

7.448

0.000
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Table 2-5 Proportions Test
For every firm, each governance variable is identified whether it has
improved or deteriorated. I code 1 for an improvement and 0 for
deterioration. I exclude variables with no improvement/deterioration.
Then, a proportions test is conducted on each governance variable.
Sample size ranges from 65 to 347. ***, **, and * denotes statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
# Observations

Mean

Z-statistic

p-value

Improvement in Institutional Ownership

347

0.660***

5.9588

0.000

Improvement in Management Ownership

347

0.542

1.5568

0.120

Improvement in Blockholders' Ownership

323

0.536

1.2798

0.201

Improvement in Duality

65

0.615*

1.8605

0.063

Improvement in G-Index

142

0.620***

2.8532

0.004

Improvement in E-Index

107

0.636***

2.8035

0.005

Improvement in Board Size

178

0.573*

1.9488

0.051

Improvement in Percent Outsiders

234

0.573**

2.2226

0.026
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Table 2-6 Additional Tests on the Improvement Index (IIndex)
The improvement index (IIndex) is a collection of governance mechanism improvements
over the event. The t-test tests whether the mean is significantly different from zero; the
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test tests whether the median is significantly different from zero.
Sample size for this analysis is 347. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *** denotes
statistical significance at the 1% level.

Panel A: t-test

Variable

# Obs.

Mean

Standard Error

P-value

Improvement Index

347

3.012***

0.0753

0.000

Panel B: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test

Variable

# Obs.

Z-Statistic

P-value

Improvement Index

347

16.221***

0.000
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Table 2-7 CAR Regression on Governance Changes
The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) associated with the
announcement of addition into the S&P 500 Index. The dependent variable is regressed
on the different governance variables and the control variables. Sample size for this
analysis is 347. P-values are reported in parenthesis. *** denotes statistical significance
at the 1% level.
CARs
Constant

0.0891
0.22

Chg in Institutional Ownership

0.0833***
0.004

Chg in Board Size

0.0002
0.876

Chg in Percent Outsiders

0.0192
0.441

Chg in G-Index

-0.0042
0.168

Chg in E-Index

0.0003
0.942

Chg in Management Ownership

0.0099
0.792

Chg in Blockholders' Ownership

0.0191
0.164

Chg in Duality

0.0094
0.156

Growth Opportunities

0.0000
0.989

Firm Size

-0.002
0.507

Prior Performance

0.013
0.882

Leverage

-0.0127
0.486

R-Square

0.0522

# Observations

347
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Table 2-8 CAR Regression on Governance Improvement
The dependent variable is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) associated with the
announcement of addition into the S&P 500 Index. Sample size for this analysis is 347.
P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1)
(2)
Constant

0.2047***
0.008

0.2186***
0.005

Improvement Index
(w/Institutional Ownership)

0.0067***
0.002

-

-

0.0045*
0.075

-0.0016
0.341

-0.0018
0.281

-0.0077**
0.019

-0.0078**
0.018

Prior Performance

-0.0748
0.422

0.0793
0.399

Leverage

-0.0238
0.22

-0.0253
0.196

R-Square

0.0493

0.031

347

347

Improvement Index
(w/o Institutional Ownership)
Growth Opportunities

Firm Size

# Observations
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Table 2-9 Performance Regression on Governance Changes
The dependent variable is the change in ROA and is regressed on the different
governance variables and the control variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***,
**, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
ROA (Year1-2)

ROA (Year1-3)

ROA (Year1-4)

ROA (Year1-5)

Constant

-0.1046
0.452

-0.0508
0.746

0.0246
0.878

-0.112
0.480

Chg in Institutional Ownership

-0.0217
0.760

0.0339
0.681

-0.0481
0.571

-0.0768
0.376

Chg in Board Size

-0.0003
0.930

-0.0073*
0.094

-0.0016
0.718

0.0022
0.624

Chg in Percent Outsiders

0.0653
0.272

0.0752
0.284

0.1407*
0.062

0.0949
0.198

Chg in G-Index

-0.0117
0.111

-0.0132
0.117

-0.0093
0.299

-0.0133
0.131

Chg in E-Index

-0.0178
0.146

-0.0096
0.510

-0.0089
0.567

-0.0186
0.238

Chg in Management Ownership

0.1433
0.104

0.2025**
0.050

0.1467
0.181

-0.0307
0.776

Chg in Blockholders' Ownership

0.0253
0.455

0.0313
0.423

0.0048
0.909

0.0187
0.674

Chg in Duality

-0.0288*
0.091

-0.0536***
0.007

-0.0294
0.157

-0.0385*
0.057

Growth Opportunities

-0.0009
0.538

-0.001
0.528

-0.00002
0.990

0.0005
0.746

Firm Size

0.0038
0.532

0.0015
0.825

-0.0026
0.715

0.0022
0.753

Prior Performance

-0.0691
0.733

-0.0129
0.956

0.0143
0.956

0.0571
0.824

Leverage

-0.0227
0.622

-0.0747
0.170

-0.0172
0.759

0.0102
0.854

R-Square

0.0622

0.0942

0.0471

0.0663

294

257

237

215

# Observations
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Table 2-10 Performance Regression on Governance Improvements
The dependent variable is the change in ROA and is regressed on the different
governance variables and the control variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis. ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.

ROA (Year1-2)

ROA (Year1-3)

ROA (Year1-4)

ROA (Year1-5)

-0.1191
0.478

-0.0549
0.773

-0.0822
0.672

-0.0832
0.684

0.0256***
0.000

0.0349***
0.000

0.0294***
0.000

0.0230***
0.000

Growth Opportunities

-0.0016
0.65

-0.0020
0.627

0.0025
0.544

-0.0016
0.723

Firm Size

0.0011
0.878

-0.0028
0.726

-0.0021
0.794

-0.0021
0.807

Prior Performance

-0.0213
0.914

0.0459
0.839

0.0225
0.927

0.1174
0.635

Leverage

-0.0068
0.881

-0.0476
0.367

0.0115
0.831

0.0338
0.537

R-Square

0.0951

0.1378

0.103

0.0697

294

257

237

215

Constant

Improvement Index

# Observations
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Table 2-11 Robustness of Results
Panel A: Market Indices and Event Windows
Two other market indices are used in the study to make sure
that the results obtained are not driven by the choice of the
market. In addition to the (0,2) window to calculate CAR, the
(-1,1) window is also used to calculate CAR. Results are
qualitatively similar regardless of market index used or event
window used.
Event Window (0,2)

Event Window (-1,1)

Sample
CRSP EW

0.043
0.001

0.045
0.002

Difference

0.042
(0.000)

0.043
(0.000)

Sample
CRSP VW

0.043
-0.001

0.045
0.000

Difference

0.043
(0.000)

0.044
(0.000)
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Panel B: Firm Size (1)
Total assets are used as a proxy for firm size. Total sales have
also been used to control for firm size. Results obtained are
qualitatively similar regardless of the proxy for firm size used.
CARs
Constant

0.1976***
0.002

Chg in Institutional Ownership

0.088***
0.002

Chg in Board Size

0.0003
0.81

Chg in Percent Outsiders

0.0195
0.427

Chg in G-Index

-0.0047
0.121

Chg in E-Index

0.0006
0.896

Chg in Management Ownership

0.0089
0.81

Chg in Blockholders' Ownership

0.194
0.154

Chg in Duality

0.009
0.173

Growth Opportunities

-0.0006
0.644

Firm Size

-0.0075**
0.014

Prior Performance

0.0281
0.741

Leverage

-0.016
0.377

R-Square

0.0679

# Observations

347
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Panel B: Firm Size (2)
Total assets are used as a proxy for firm size. Total sales have
also been used to control for firm size. Results obtained are
qualitatively similar regardless of the proxy for firm size used.
CAR (1)

CAR (2)

Constant

0.1674***
0.009

0.1711***
0.008

Improvement Index
(w/Institutional Ownership)

0.0063***
0.002

-

-

0.0049**
0.035

Growth Opportunities

-0.00006
0.965

-0.0002
0.905

Firm Size

-0.0068**
0.025

-0.0066**
0.031

Prior Performance

0.0311
0.715

0.0286
0.739

Leverage

-0.0171
0.343

-0.0186
0.308

R-Square

0.0457

0.0306

347

347

Improvement Index
(w/o Institutional Ownership)

# Observations
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Panel C: G-Index versus E-Index (1)
The G-Index, developed by Gompers et al. (2003), captures 24
provisions that restrict shareholder rights. Bebchuk et al. (2004) argue
that 6 specific provisions 8 contribute to the explanatory power of the
G-Index. Results obtained are qualitatively similar regardless of
whether the E-Index was excluded or the G-Index was excluded.
CAR (1)

CAR (2)

Constant

0.2033***
0.009

0.2025***
0.009

Improvement Index
(w/o E-Index)

0.0066***
0.006

-

Improvement Index
(w/o G-Index)

-

0.008***
0.001

-0.0017
0.308

-0.0015
0.359

-0.0075**
0.022

-0.0077**
0.019

Prior Performance

-0.0722
0.44

-0.0763
0.411

Leverage

-0.0235
0.227

-0.022
0.254

R-Square

0.0438

0.0535

347

347

Growth Opportunities

Firm Size

# Observations

*** and ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively.

8

The provisions are poison pills, golden parachutes, staggered boards, limits to shareholder by-law amendments,
supermajority requirements for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter amendments.

45

Panel C: G-Index versus E-Index (2)
The analysis is performed using the IIndex (excluding the G-Index).
Results obtained are qualitatively similar.
ROA (Year1-2)

ROA (Year1-3)

ROA (Year1-4)

ROA (Year1-5)

-0.1091
0.523

-0.0569
0.769

-0.0806
0.682

-0.0799
0.699

0.0231***
0.000

0.0346***
0.000

0.0276***
0.000

0.0211***
0.002

Growth Opportunities

-0.0019
0.612

-0.0021
0.621

0.0023
0.579

-0.0017
0.706

Firm Size

0.0012
0.863

-0.0024
0.77

-0.0018
0.833

-0.0018
0.837

Prior Performance

-0.0375
0.851

0.0400
0.861

0.0398
0.873

0.1231
0.623

Leverage

-0.0024
0.958

-0.0359
0.503

0.0231
0.673

0.0387
0.485

R-Square

0.0669

0.1141

0.0766

0.0496

294

257

237

215

Constant

Improvement Index
(w/o G-Index)

# Observations

*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Panel C: G-Index versus E-Index (3)
The analysis is performed using the IIndex (excluding the E-Index).
Results obtained are qualitatively similar.
ROA (Year1-2)

ROA (Year1-3)

ROA (Year1-4)

ROA (Year1-5)

-0.1429
0.397

-0.076
0.692

-0.1089
0.576

-0.0996
0.628

0.0279***
0.000

0.0365***
0.000

0.0311***
0.000

0.0234***
0.000

Growth Opportunities

-0.0018
0.61

-0.0025
0.547

0.0022
0.598

-0.0019
0.674

Firm Size

0.0021
0.769

-0.0017
0.829

-0.0009
0.909

-0.0012
0.888

Prior Performance

-0.006
0.976

0.0562
0.805

0.0581
0.813

0.1372
0.581

Leverage

-0.0051
0.91

-0.0494
0.351

0.0113
0.835

0.0306
0.577

R-Square

0.0931

0.1297

0.0988

0.0631

294

257

237

215

Constant

Improvement Index
(w/o E-Index)

# Observations

*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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CHAPTER 3
INTERNAL LABOR MARKET HOMOGENEITY AND CEO
SUCCESSION ISSUES
3.1 Introduction
Chief Executive Officers (CEO) turnover draws a great deal of attention in organizational
research (Finkelstein et al., 2009). One stream of research focuses on executive succession, in
particular, the rationale behind internal versus external successions (Parrino, 1997; Farrell and
Whidbee, 2003; Helfat and Bailey, 2005; Martins and Lima, 2006; Xuan, 2009). While a firm
can promote an internal candidate or hire someone from outside, succession decisions are always
difficult. For example, in the case of General Electric (GE), the retirement of its CEO and
Chairman, John Welch, sparked quite a debate. The GE board of directors was evaluating who
should take over Mr. Welch’s position. The top three candidates were all on GE’s payroll;
however none of them seemed to be the clear favorite. Ultimately, the board picked Jeffrey
Immelt, head of GE’s medical imaging division. When contemplating, the board had to manage
the expectations and disappointment of other GE executives. The other two finalists, James
McNerney and Robert Nardelli, eventually left GE. This case shows that corporate successions
have to be managed properly. Otherwise, it may cause chaos and resentment.
Prior studies have noticed differences between internal and external CEO successions
(Datta and Guthrie, 1994, Chan, 1996; Agrawal et al., 2006). Chan (1996) reports that among
the 84 CEOs of the Fortune 100 firms who were promoted to the position since 1984, only 11
were recruited from outside the organization. Agrawal et al. (2006) also document that more
than 80% of CEO successions in large U.S. firms involve the promotion of an insider. These
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studies suggest that most companies give preference to the internal candidate in a CEO
succession decision.
There are alternative viewpoints behind the favoritism towards internal candidates.
Human capital theories suggest internal candidates usually possess firm-specific knowledge and
relationships. Their ability can be observed with less noise; and less recruitment and training
costs are needed when promoting from inside (Chan, 1996). However, in many cases, candidates’
experience and ability are not easily measurable or comparable. In fact, Agrawal et al. (2006)
rule out the possibility that experienced candidates are more favored in CEO successions.
An alternative explanation for why firms prefer internal over external candidates is based
on tournament theory. Initially used in labor economics and widely applied in sports economics,
tournament theory was introduced into the corporate context by Lazear and Rosen (1981).
Tournament theory is distinct from other incentive devices (e.g., human capital) in that it focuses
on relative performance and pay among the executives rather than those of individual executives
(Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Bull et al., 1987; Eriksson, 1999). In corporate tournaments,
competition is viewed as an incentive device with which agents compete for the fixed prizes
according to their relative performance (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003).

The increased

competition induces the executives to work hard in order to achieve the prize of becoming the
CEO. The larger the prize, the greater the incentive for the executives to work harder in order to
achieve success (to become CEO). To boost productive competition in the internal job market,
firms give preference to internal CEO candidates and handicap external ones (Chan, 1996;
Agrawal et al, 2006).
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Using the compensation of executives, I develop the Heterogeneity Index (HI), in order
to examine its relationship with CEO succession issues. The HI measures the compensation
concentration within each firm. Specifically, I test whether compensation diversity among top
executives affects (1) the likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) the likelihood of a turnover,
and (3) the compensation change after ascending to the CEO post.
Using firms in the S&P 1500 index from 1996 to 2006, I find a negative and significant
relationship between compensation concentration and the likelihood of an internal replacement.
Homogeneity in compensation among executives may induce them to work harder to win the
tournament (i.e., CEO post) and an internal candidate will be more likely to succeed the outgoing
CEO. Consistent with prior studies (Parrino, 1997; Huson et al., 2001; Goyal and Park, 2002;
Fee and Hadlock, 2004; Maury, 2006; Florou and Pope, 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009;
Chakraborty et al., 2009; Chi and Wang, 2009), I find that poor prior performance is associated
with a greater likelihood of a turnover. In addition, I show that this performance-turnover
relationship is strengthened by the homogeneous nature in compensation among executives.
Specifically, the more comparable executives’ compensation is, the more likely that poor
performance leads to a turnover. For internal replacements, I find that the compensation increase
is significantly greater for firms with a homogeneous top management team (TMT). The prize of
winning the tournament is positively related to the homogeneous nature of compensation among
executives.
This study contributes to the literature in a couple of ways. First, I develop a novel
measure of compensation concentration.

Using executives’ compensation information, the
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nature of the concentration within the TMT can be estimated. Examining the implications of
such concentration on CEO succession decisions is an important and interesting contribution.
Second, this study provides a more observable way to anticipate CEO successions, using
the HI I develop. Prior research focuses on CEO successions by examining organizational
structure and industry homogeneity (Agrawal et al., 2006) or studying firms’ succession plans
(Naveen, 2006).

Both studies center their attention to only certain characteristics, e.g.,

comparability (Agrawal et al., 2006) or relay succession (Naveen, 2006).

Examining TMT’s

compensation provides explicit information about the homogeneity of the executives, and thus,
offers an interesting approach to study CEO successions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the related
literature and develops the hypotheses. The data and sample are described next, followed by a
discussion of the results. The next section discusses the robustness of the results. The last
section summarizes and provides some concluding remarks.

3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
Research on Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has been overwhelming 9. Issues covered
include but are not limited to turnovers, governance, performance, and compensation. When a
CEO leaves the company, speculation about the reason for departure and speculation about the
potential successors arise. One of the main reasons for CEO departure is poor firm performance
(Parrino, 1997; Maury, 2006; Florou and Pope, 2008; Chang and Wong, 2009).

As for

successors, the company can either engage someone from outside or promote someone from
9

A simple search on Google Scholar with keywords like “CEO” and “Chief Executive Officer” yields 470,000 and
409,000 results, respectively.
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within. Even though research has shown that large firms prefer insiders over outsiders (Chan,
1996; Agrawal et al., 2006), succession decisions are still very difficult. Two articles (Lublin,
2004; Orwall and Lublin, 2004) published in the Wall Street Journal illustrate this point. On the
one hand, companies announce retirements early to reduce uncertainty. On the other hand,
investors wonder whether a “lame duck” CEO will benefit shareholders. In addition, company
boards have to consider the merits of each potential candidate (both internal and external) and
manage the expectations of other executives. If not managed properly, the situation could turn
for the worse, causing disorder and unpleasantness.
Prior research has examined insider versus outsider CEO succession decisions from
various perspectives, among which tournament theory has received a lot of recent attention.
Tournament theory has primarily been used in labor economics and applied in sports economics.
Built on this theory, Lazear and Rosen (1981) posit a distinct compensation scheme based on
rank in an organization and relative performance.

While the conventional compensation

schemes like human capital models 10 and agency models 11 suggest pay based on input (ability,
experience, and efforts) or output (direct performance) of individuals, the rank-based
compensation scheme focuses on one’s performance relative to others.. Lazear and Rosen (1981)
believe that tournament theory induces the same efficient allocation of resources as the other
schemes.
Studies have examined the economic efficiency of the rank-based scheme (Green and
Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983; Rosen, 1986). They conclude that individuals’ ability,
experience and individual performance are not always easy to measure; the rank-based
10
11

Compensation is based on education, experience, etc. (Becker, 1964).
Compensation is contingent on some conditions like good performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sappington, 1991).
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compensation scheme provides a better incentive device for executives to work harder in order to
achieve prizes.
Empirical evidence also supports the rank-based compensation scheme. Using a sample
of Danish executives, Eriksson (1999) finds that there is a stable convex relation between pay
and job levels and that there is a positive relation between the number of “important” managers
and the wage spread. Bognanno (2001) shows similar results that pay rises strongly with
hierarchical level. In an experimental setting, Bull et al. (1987) observe large variance of effort
level in all rank-order tournaments. The mean effort level of disadvantaged subjects is above
their equilibrium level. Their results are also supportive of tournament theory.
Recently, tournament theory has been extended to corporate tournaments among senior
executives (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Conyon et al., 2001; Heyman, 2005; Harbring and
Irlenbusch, 2008; Kale et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2010; Shen et al., 2010). While some studies fail
to find support for tournament theory (Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008; Shen et al., 2010), most
studies do find some support (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Conyon et al., 2001; Heyman,
2005; Kale et al., 2009). Tournaments to win the CEO prize induce senior executives to work
hard. The competition among senior executives arises from their desire for power and career
advancement (Shen and Cannella, 2002).
Prior studies have used different factors to explain turnovers and successions. Parrino
(1997) shows that the likelihood of forced turnover increases with industry homogeneity. He
argues that it is easier (and less costly) for firms to recruit someone from another firm within the
same industry since that executive possesses much of the human capital needed.
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Agrawal et al. (2006) use comparability among insiders and comparability between
insiders and outsiders to explain outsider handicapping choices in firms. They propose that
insiders are more comparable in firms with a product or line of business organizational structure,
and these firms are more likely to choose inside candidates to succeed the CEO position. In
another study, Naveen (2006) argues that larger and diversified firms, being more complex in
nature, are more likely to use relay succession. Also, firms that do relay succession planning are
more likely to select an internal candidate as its CEO. Her definition of having succession plans
is having an heir apparent. However, the definition of having a succession plan is debatable
and/or unclear as firms do not always announce their heir apparent publicly. Both studies focus
on internal successions, but only identify certain characteristics (having more comparability
between candidates; having an heir apparent).
While some studies have examined the pay gap 12 (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002;
Carpenter and Sanders, 2004) as a measure of CEO power (Finkelstein, 1992; Hayward and
Hambrick, 1997; Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006; Shen et al., 2010), others use the pay gap as a
proxy for tournament incentive (Heyman, 2005; Gnyawali et al., 2008; Kale et al., 2009).
However, the pay gap only takes the compensations of two (at most three) executives into
account and thus does not capture the overall competitive nature at the firm.
Tournament theory focuses on relative pay among peers, which implies the importance of
the internal labor market within each firm. Building on this theory, I measure concentration with
characteristics of the internal labor market using a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
12

Pay gap is calculated as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the average TMT. Some studies
have defined pay gap differently, either as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the median TMT
(Kale et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2010), or as the difference in compensation between the CEO and the next highest
paid executive (Mobbs and Raheja, 2010).
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The HHI (Hirschman, 1945) is a measure of market concentration. It is defined as the sum of the
squares of market shares of the top firms within an industry. A higher HHI generally indicates
more market power, hence less competition. Based on this modified HHI-based index, I develop
the Heterogeneity Index (HI) using different compensation measures to estimate how diverse the
executives are.

A high HI indicates that the compensation among the executives is more

differentiated (heterogeneous), implying that one or more of the executives’ compensation
dominates the others.

If executives are paid according to their ability/skill level, that

executive(s)’ capabilities may be above the others and/or may be delegated more significant
responsibilities than the other executives. A low HI indicates that the compensation among
executives is more comparable (homogeneous), which may induce productive competition
among them and encourages them to work harder to “win” the prize – the CEO post.
If internal labor markets are more homogeneous, the firm should be more likely to select
an inside candidate to replace the departing CEO. For a tournament to benefit the firm through
harder work by executives, firms must provide a high probability that an internal candidate will
be selected (Chan 1996). On the one hand, if an executive’s compensation overshadows the
others, it may dampen the other executives’ drive knowing that the goal (becoming the CEO) is
too far-reached. On the other hand, when compensation levels are more comparable, they may
feel that they have a better shot of becoming the CEO if they work hard. Following tournament
predictions, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 1: The more homogeneous the internal labor markets, the greater the likelihood of an
internal replacement.
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For tournaments to be successful, aspiring executives need to perceive a greater
likelihood of achieving the prize. Thus, boards must be willing to replace an underperforming
CEO (Lehn and Makhija, 1997; Dahya et al., 2002; Lausten, 2002; Brunello et al., 2003; Parrino
et al., 2003; Hillier et al., 2005; Kato and Long, 2006; Conyon and He, 2008; Finkelstein et al.,
2009). Using alternative measures of performance (economic value added and market value
added) and stock return, Lehn and Makhija (1997) find a significant inverse relation between
performance and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Focusing on large publicly-traded firms during
the 1982-93 period, Parrino et al. (2003) show that firms experienced poor performance prior to
a forced CEO turnover. The negative turnover-performance relationship persists not only in the
United States. Dahya et al. (2002) demonstrate a significant negative correlation between CEO
turnover and corporate performance in U.K. firms. Using Chinese listed firms, Kato and Long
(2006) show that management turnover and firm performance are inversely related. In another
Chinese study, Conyon and He (2008) report a similar relation between CEO turnover and
measures of firm performance. Also, as Parrino (1997) highlights, succession costs may be
reduced if a viable internal candidate is available, which should be facilitated by greater
competition. Hence, I propose the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: CEO turnover will be more sensitive to firm performance when internal labor
markets are more homogeneous.
Larger prizes should result in more effort.

Drago and Garvey (1998) examine the

relationship between efforts and promotion incentives and find that when promotion incentives
are strong, individual efforts are increased. Homogeneity among executives should induce
greater efforts. Hence, new internal CEOs emerging from homogeneous internal labor market
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environments will receive larger increases in compensation relative to those emerging from
heterogeneous environments. O’Reilly et al. (1988) and Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993) note
that tournament theory implies the prize should increase with the number of contestants or the
competition for the position. Kale et al. (2009) provide empirical support for this view. The
authors find a positive relation between the number of vice presidents (VPs) and the pay gap (i.e.,
a proxy for the tournament prize). Eriksson (1999) also provide support for the tournament view
by showing a positive relationship between the number of participants and the prize of the
tournament in Danish firms. In a U.K. study, Conyon et al. (2001) report that the pay gap is
positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. Rather than using pay gap as
an estimate for the size of the tournament prize (Conyon et al., 2001; Kale et al., 2009; Kale et al.,
2010), I compare the compensation of those CEOs promoted internally with his compensation
from before his promotion to obtain the actual increase in compensation. Hence, I propose my
third and last hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The prize of the new CEO will be higher if internal labor markets are more
homogeneous.
3.3 Data and Methodology
CEO successions are identified using the ExecuComp database from 1996 to 2006.
ExecuComp contains compensation and executive data for firms in the S&P 500, S&P Midcap
400, and S&P Smallcap 600. A CEO is defined as a person who is identified as a Chief
Executive Officer of the firm in ExecuComp, and all other executives are classified as TMT.
Internal versus external replacements are identified by tracking the career paths of the new CEOs.
Executives with the firm less than one year are classified as outsiders. Insider appointments are
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verified through ExecuComp, proxy statements, and news articles. Of the 1,663 turnovers
identified, only 21% of the replacements are recruited externally. The proportion of internal
promotion (79%) is slightly lower than the fraction (82%) reported by Agrawal et al. (2006).
In this study, three measures of compensation are used: (1) total compensation, (2)
current compensation, and (3) equity-based compensation.

Total compensation (TDC) is

calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total value of restricted stock
granted, total value of stock options granted, long-term incentive payouts, and all other
compensation.

Current compensation (SAL) is calculated as the sum of salary and bonus

whereas equity-based compensation (EBC) is calculated as the sum of total value of restricted
stock granted and total value of stock options granted.
To measure internal labor market concentration, I compute the Heterogeneity Index (HI),
which is based on the HHI, using the three measures of compensation, as follows:
⎛
⎜
N
⎜ Cj
HeterogeneityIndex i = ∑ ⎜ N
j =1
⎜⎜ ∑ C j
⎝ j =1

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟⎟
⎠

2

where N is the number of top executives (excluding the CEO) at firm i and Cj is executive j’s (1)
TDC, (2) SAL, or (3) EBC.
The control variables used are board characteristics, pay gap, firm size, prior performance,
and leverage. CEO firing/hiring decisions are ultimately made by the corporate board. Hence, I
control for board-related characteristics. Board characteristics used in this study include board
size, board independence, and duality. Board size is the number of directors on a corporate
board. Board independence is the proportion of outside directors on a board. Directors are
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classified as independent/outsiders if they are not employees of the firm, do not have substantial
business relations with the firm, are not related to employees, or are not former employees.
Duality is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board,
and 0 otherwise. Board-related variables are hand-collected from proxy statements.
The pay gap, defined as the pay disparity between the CEO and average TMT, has been
used in quite a few studies. Some studies show that large pay disparity among senior executives
has a harmful effect on the firm itself 13 (Pfeffer and Langton, 1993; Bloom and Michel, 2002;
Carpenter and Sanders, 2004; Siegel and Hambrick, 2005; Fredrickson et al., 2010) while
others 14 present evidence showing otherwise (Henderson and Fredrickson, 2001; Heyman, 2005;
Gnyawali et al., 2008; Kale et al., 2009, Kale et al., 2010). Hence, I control for pay gap in my
analysis. Data on executives’ compensation is obtained from ExecuComp.
I control for firm size because managers in larger firms are less likely to be replaced
(Volpin, 2002; Firth et al., 2006; Chang and Wong, 2009; Wang, 2010). I use the natural
logarithm of total assets as a measure of firm size. Prior firm performance is an important
determinant of CEO turnover (Huson et al., 2001; Chakraborty et al., 2009; Chang and Wong,
2009). Hence, I control for prior performance using industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA)
for the prior year. Firms are classified into industries based on their 2-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes. Industry-adjusted ROA is the firm’s ROA in excess of the median
firm’s ROA in that same 2-digit SIC industry. ROA is calculated as net income divided by total
assets. Creditors play a role in disciplining managers (Jensen, 1986; Chang and Wong, 2009).
Thus, I control for capital structure. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets.
13
14

Behavioral perspective based on relative deprivation theory and/or social comparison theory.
Economic perspective based on tournament theory.
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Variables used to obtain and calculate firm size, prior firm performance, and leverage are
obtained from COMPUSTAT.
Table 3-1 presents the summary statistics for the sample. The average HIs range from
0.2156 (current) to 0.3575 (equity-based), depending on the compensation measure utilized.
Using compensation as an indication of individual ability, the more homogeneous the internal
labor market, the more comparable their ability. The HIs indicate that the internal labor market
is quite homogeneous. Looking at the pay disparity, the average pay gap is between $835,000
and $3.367 million, slightly above the pay gaps reported by Kale et al. (2010). As shown by
Kale et al. (2010), pay gaps have increased over the years. The discrepancy in pay gap can
possibly be explained by the difference in sample periods between the two studies 15.
The average CEO makes $5.3 million in total compensation; his average current
compensation and average equity-based compensation is about $1.465 million and almost $3
million, respectively. A typical corporate board has 9 (median) members, of which about 65%
are independent. In 67% of the firms, the CEO also holds the Chairman of the board position.
Boyd (1995) and Tuggle et al. (2010) report CEO/Chair duality in 46% and 66% of their samples,
respectively.

The proportion reported here is higher than what Boyd (1995) found.

The

difference could be due to the sample period: Boyd’s sample covers the 1980s whereas my
sample extends over from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s. The average firm outperforms its
peers, with an industry-adjusted ROA of about 4%. On average, a firm has about 19% of longterm debt in its capital structure.

15

The sample period covered by Kale et al. (2010) is from 1993 to 2004 whereas this paper covers the 1996-2006
period.
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3.4 Results and Discussions
To test the first hypothesis on homogeneity and replacement type, I employ a logistic
regression model to predict the likelihood of an internal (versus external) candidate being chosen
as the new CEO. First, I separate the sample into two groups: firm-years which experienced a
CEO turnover and firm-years which did not experience a CEO turnover. From the “experienced
a CEO turnover” group, I further divide the subsample into two subgroups: internal replacement
and external replacement. To empirically test the first hypothesis, the following equation was
estimated:
Internali = α + β1 HI i + ψ * CONTROLS + ε i

(1)

where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the new CEO is
promoted from within the company, and zero otherwise; HI is the heterogeneity index, control
variables include pay gap, duality, board independence, board size, firm size, prior performance,
and leverage.
In addition to using the level of HI, I also include a dummy variable, SIMILAR, to capture
the similarity of compensation within the internal labor market. The econometric equation is as
follows:
Internali = α + β1 SIMILARi +ψ * CONTROLS + ε i

(2)

where SIMILAR is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the HI is below the median HI, and
zero otherwise; all other variables are as previously defined.
Both equations are administered thrice each, based on the three measures of
compensation. The results are presented in Table 3-2. As expected, the coefficients for HI are
all negative; however the coefficient for one specification is insignificant.
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A lower HI is

associated with a higher probability of an internal replacement. As mentioned earlier, a lower HI
implies homogeneity. Hence, the more homogeneous the internal labor market, the greater the
likelihood of an internal replacement. The results from using SIMILAR also produce similar
inference. The coefficients for SIMILAR are positive and significant (p<0.05), suggesting that a
more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with a greater likelihood of an internal
replacement. The results support Hypothesis 1 – the more homogeneous the internal labor
market, the higher the probability of an internal replacement.
A few of the control variables yield significant results. First, the coefficients for pay gap
are negative and significant (p<0.01), suggesting that a lower pay gap is associated with a higher
probability of an internal replacement. Second, the negative and significant coefficient for board
independence indicates that the more independent the corporate board, the lower the likelihood
of an internal replacement. Third, the relation between duality and the probability of an internal
replacement is negative. Prior to the current replacement, if the CEO shares the Chairman
position, the lower the probability of an internal candidate succeeding the CEO post. Next, the
coefficient for board size is positive and significant. A larger board is associated with a higher
probability of an internal replacement. Finally, the positive relation between prior performance
and the likelihood of an internal replacement indicates that if the firm is doing well prior to the
CEO change, the new CEO is more likely to be promoted from within.
I employ the use of a random effects logistic regression model to test the second
hypothesis. All firm-year observations (including those which experienced a turnover and those
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which did not experience a turnover) are used in this analysis. To test this hypothesis, I use the
following equation 16:

Turnoveri = α + β1 SIMILARi + β 2 ( Ri ,t − Rm,t ) + β 3 ( Ri ,t −1 − Rm,t −1 ) +

β 4 [ SIMILAR * ( Ri ,t −1 − Rm,t −1 )] + φ * CONTROLS + ε i

(3)

where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is serving in his last
full fiscal year and zero otherwise.

The independent variables include SIMILAR, the

contemporaneous and lagged difference between the return on firm i in year t and the market 17
return in the same period. The control variables are as previously defined.
The regression results from Equation (3) are summarized in Table 3-3. The coefficients
for SIMILAR are positive and significant, indicating that the more homogeneous the internal
labor market, the higher the probability of a turnover. As expected, the coefficients for the
lagged excess returns are negative and significant. This result is in line with what others have
predicted (Dahya et al., 2002; Lausten, 2002).
To see whether the second hypothesis is supported, the coefficient of interest is the
interaction term. In two of the three specifications, the negative and significant coefficients for
the interaction term (Excess Returnt-1*SIMILAR) confirm that the homogeneity nature of the
internal labor market strengthens the performance-turnover relationship.

In firms with

homogeneous internal labor markets, the performance-turnover relationship is stronger in that the
negative effect is larger. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported.

16

In addition to SIMILAR, the dependent variable is also regressed on HI and other control variables. Main results
do not change.
17
The Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) Index is used as the market index. Additional tests are conducted using
other market indices. See “Robustness Test” section for more information.
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For the control variables, only two of them (pay gap and duality) are statistically
significant for all specifications. The positive coefficient for pay gap indicates that the larger the
pay gap between the CEO and the VPs, the greater the likelihood of turnover. As for duality, the
coefficient is negative, suggesting that if the CEO/Chairman position is held by one person, the
lower the probability of turnover. This result is consistent with the notion that a CEO holding
the Chairman position is more powerful and entrenched and hence less likely to be fired/replaced
(Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Tuggle et al., 2010).
The coefficient for board independence is positive and significant (p<0.05) for two
specifications. This result seems to suggest that the independent directors are performing a
monitoring role, consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) and Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003). The
relationship between firm size and the likelihood of turnover is positive and significant (p<0.1
and p<0.01) for two specifications, suggesting that holding all else constant, larger firms are
more likely to experience top management turnover.
To test the third hypothesis, I use only the CEOs promoted from within the company for
two reasons. First, tracing prior compensation for external candidates is difficult because they
could have come from non-public companies, non-US companies, etc. Second, it is more
straightforward to compare their compensation if they are at the same company. As mentioned
earlier, this procedure yields 1,315 observations. Panel A of Table 3-4 presents the summary
statistics. Median total compensation increases approximately $473,000 while median equitybased compensation increases only about $49,000.
Using the internally promoted CEO subsample, I compare the compensation change from
before they were promoted. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 3-4. The paired t-test
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analyses show that there is a significant difference in compensation changes between the two
groups. In all compensation measures, the compensation change for the “homogeneous” group
is greater than the compensation change for the “heterogeneous” group. The differences in
compensation changes between “homo- and hetero-” for SAL and TDC are about $217,000 and
$1.311 million, respectively. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
In summary, I have shown that the more homogeneous the internal labor market, (1) the
higher the probability of an internal replacement, (2) the more sensitive CEO turnover will be to
firm performance, and (3) the higher the prize of the new CEO. These results seem to suggest
that HI may be a useful proxy for competition among executives.

3.5 Robustness of Results
The reported HI is based on compensation concentration among top executives,
excluding the CEO. Alternatively, I also include the CEO in the calculation of HI. The
predicted signs and significance are generally similar to the HI reported 18.
The results reported earlier are based on returns in excess of the S&P 500 index. To
make sure the results were not driven by the choice of the market index, I conduct additional
tests on the market indices. Two other market indices (CRSP value-weighted index and CRSP
equal-weighted index) are used to calculate the excess returns to test Hypothesis 2. Results are
presented in Table 3-5. In addition to using the logistic regression model to test Hypotheses 1 &
2, I repeat all analyses using the probit regression model. Table 3-6 presents the results. All
results are qualitatively similar regardless of market index or regression model used.

18

Results not reported.
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions
Research on chief executive officers has been extensive. One aspect of particular interest
is CEO turnover/replacements. Because the CEO is the head of the corporation who makes
decisions which affect the company’s short-term as well as long-term strategies, investors and
researchers alike have an interest on the outcome of this event.
In this paper, I develop a Heterogeneity Index, which measures the compensation
concentration of the internal labor market for the executives. I propose three hypotheses and the
results provide support for all of them. I find that the probability of an internal replacement is
higher in a more homogeneous internal labor market. In addition, the increase in compensation
is positively related to the homogeneous nature of the internal labor market.
I also find a positive relation between the homogeneous nature of the internal labor
market and the likelihood of a CEO turnover. The negative relation between prior performance
and probability of a turnover is also found. In addition, this negative performance-turnover
relationship is magnified by a more homogeneous internal labor market.
The results from this study suggest that homogeneity among TMT provides an alternative
perspective to examining CEO-related issues. The heterogeneity index I develop can possibly be
used as a proxy for the competition among top management. Overall, my results provide some
support for tournament theory.
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Table 3-1 Summary Statistics
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Internal
Succession is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the new CEO is promoted from
within the same company, and zero otherwise. Board size is the total number of directors
on a corporate board. Board independence is the proportion of outside directors as a
percentage of board size. Duality is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO
also holds the Chairman post, and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of long term debt
over total assets. Prior performance is the industry-adjusted ROA of the company for the
previous year. Market value of equity is the market capitalization of the company (stock
price X number of shares outstanding). Total sample size is 14,843 firm-years. The
difference in sample size is due to missing data or information not available.

Variables

Mean

Median

St. Dev.

# Obs.

0.2156

0.2087

0.0621

14,839

Equity-Based Compensation

0.3575

0.3009

0.1763

12,580

Total Compensation

0.2708

0.2517

0.0854

14,815

1,465.33

1,000.00

1,764.17

14,843

Equity-Based Compensation

2,996.72

838.10

11,517.96

14,843

Total Compensation

5,296.29

2,604.78

12,448.39

14,759

Pay Gap:($ thousands)
Current Compensation

835.44

532.86

1,328.45

14,843

Equity-Based Compensation

2,020.86

454.69

9,929.40

14,843

Total Compensation

3,367.19

1,445.39

10,514.34

14,843

0.7907

1.0000

0.4069

1,663

9.57

9.00

2.93

14,843

Board Independence

0.6500

0.6700

0.1750

14,843

Duality

0.6650

1.0000

0.4780

14,843

Market Value of Equity ($ millions)

8.31

1.68

26.41

12,257

Total Assets ($ millions)

13.69

1.76

65.63

14,760

Leverage

0.1901

0.1689

0.1645

14,728

Prior Performance

0.0405

0.0444

0.1253

14,760

Heterogeneity Index:
Current Compensation

CEO Compensation: ($ thousands)
Current Compensation

Internal Succession
Board Size

75

Table 3-2 Logistic Regression – Internal versus External Replacement
The dependent variables take the value 1 if the new CEO is promoted from within the
same company, and zero otherwise. Each dependent variable is regressed using a logit
model on the (1) Heterogeneity Index or (2) a dummy variable, SIMILAR, and the
various control variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis.

SAL

SAL

EBC

EBC

TDC

TDC

Constant

0.5372
0.226

0.387
0.317

1.9205***
0.005

0.4852
0.457

1.4349***
0.001

0.5374
0.174

Heterogeneity Index

-0.3552
0.748

---

-3.5986***
0.000

---

-2.5621***
0.000

---

---

0.151
0.247

---

0.5241**
0.022

---

0.3419**
0.014

Pay Gap

-0.2409***
0.000

-0.2345***
0.000

0.0774
0.482

-0.0707
0.469

-0.2158***
0.001

-0.2741***
0.000

Duality

-0.3898***
0.003

-0.3968***
0.002

-0.2512
0.218

-0.2879
0.154

-0.3538***
0.007

-0.3663***
0.005

-0.7236*
0.077

-0.7213*
0.078

-0.2691
0.681

-0.0145
0.982

-0.8455**
0.039

-0.7251*
0.074

Board Size

0.1418***
0.000

0.1406***
0.000

0.1508***
0.003

0.1588***
0.002

0.1243***
0.000

0.1265***
0.000

Firm Size

0.0795
0.113

0.0809
0.106

-0.0458
0.55

-0.0478
0.53

0.083
0.101

0.0869*
0.084

0.8734**
0.011

0.873**
0.011

2.088***
0.005

2.1164***
0.004

1.0164***
0.004

0.9873***
0.005

Leverage

0.3785
0.337

0.3811
0.334

-0.0676
0.914

-0.0359
0.953

0.3609
0.363

0.3372
0.393

R-Square

0.0552

0.0559

0.0682

0.0552

0.0727

0.0677

# Observations

1,663

1,663

831

831

1,663

1,663

SIMILAR

Percentage Outsiders

Prior Performance

Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3-3 Logistic Regression – CEO Turnover versus No CEO Turnover
The dependent variables take the value 1 if the CEO is serving in his last full fiscal year,
and zero otherwise. Each dependent variable is regressed using a logit model on (1) a
dummy variable, SIMILAR, (2) the interaction term (excess returnt-1*SIMILAR), and the
various control variables. P-values are reported in parenthesis.

SAL

SAL

EBC

EBC

TDC

TDC

Constant

-2.5162***
0.000

-2.5224***
0.000

-2.9795***
0.000

-2.9778***
0.000

-2.4959***
0.000

-2.4972***
0.000

SIMILAR

0.7185***
0.000

0.7267***
0.000

0.229***
0.009

0.2136**
0.015

0.337***
0.000

0.3377***
0.000

---

-0.2296*
0.065

---

-0.4164**
0.016

---

-0.05
0.688

0.0085
0.843

0.008
0.854

-0.0505
0.481

-0.0488
0.499

-0.0173
0.722

-0.0176
0.718

Excess Return (time t-1)

-0.3459***
0.000

-0.2057***
0.031

-0.2586***
0.002

-0.5126***
0.000

-0.4009***
0.000

-0.3761***
0.000

Pay Gap

0.1553***
0.000

0.155***
0.000

0.3228***
0.000

0.3232***
0.000

0.3246***
0.000

0.3241***
0.000

Duality

-1.3119***
0.000

-1.3122***
0.000

-1.4367***
0.000

-1.4387***
0.000

-1.3049***
0.000

-1.3047***
0.000

Percentage Outsiders

0.4054***
0.010

0.3994**
0.011

0.1581
0.496

0.1706
0.463

0.3726**
0.017

0.373**
0.017

Board Size

0.0089
0.424

0.0093
0.405

0.009
0.552

0.0094
0.538

0.0201*
0.068

0.0201*
0.068

Firm Size

0.0362*
0.071

0.0361*
0.072

0.0778***
0.005

0.0768***
0.006

0.0173
0.386

0.0174
0.382

Leverage

0.1556
0.332

0.1531
0.340

0.2318
0.314

0.2383
0.300

0.1551
0.328

0.1547
0.329

-4,881.36

-4,879.69

-2,552.94

-2,549.98

-4,959.08

-4,959.00

843.65 (0.00)

846.99 (0.00)

407.65 (0.00)

413.57 (0.00)

771.10 (0.00)

771.26 (0.00)

14,569

14,569

8,853

8,853

14,596

14,596

Excess Return (time t-1) *
SIMILAR
Excess Return (time t)

Log-likelihood
Chi-square
# Observations

Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3-4 Compensation Changes after Promotion to CEO
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Compensation changes are calculated as the difference in
compensation between after becoming CEO and prior to
becoming CEO.

Variables
Mean
Compensation Change Following Internal Succession:
($ thousands)
Current Compensation
356.14

Median

St. Dev.

# Obs.

208.21

1,142.79

1,315

8.95

48.55

11,385.97

1,315

768.90

473.32

11,729.30

1,315

Equity-Based Compensation
Total Compensation

Panel B: Paired t-test
To compare compensation changes between two groups:
“Homogeneous” and “Heterogeneous”.

# Obs.

SAL

# Obs.

EBC

# Obs.

TDC

Homogeneous

657

464.59

573

337.50

657

1,424.85

Heterogeneous

658

247.86

742

-244.77

658

113.95

Difference

216.73***

582.27

1310.9**

t-stat.

3.45

0.92

2.03

p-value

0.000

0.358

0.043

Note: *** & ** denotes statistical significance at the 1% & 5% levels, respectively.
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Table 3-5 Robustness Test – Market Indices
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variables

Mean

Median

St. Dev.

# Obs.

Excess Returns (at year t)
S&P 500

0.0617

0.0181

0.6328

14,843

CRSP Value-weighted

0.0548

0.0122

0.6335

14,843

CRSP Equal-weighted

0.0569

0.0116

0.6337

14,843

Excess Returns (at year t-1)
S&P 500

0.0814

0.0272

0.6379

14,843

CRSP Value-weighted

0.0743

0.0219

0.6387

14,843

CRSP Equal-weighted

0.0775

0.0221

0.6391

14,843

Panel B: Two Sample t-test
Mean

St. Dev.

Mean

St. Dev.

Excess Returns (at year t)
S&P 500

0.0617

0.6328

S&P 500

0.0617

0.6328

CRSP Value-weighted

0.0548

0.6335

CRSP Equal-weighted

0.0569

0.6337

Difference

0.0069

Difference

0.0048

p-value

0.347

p-value

0.509

t-statistics

0.9404

t-statistics

0.6607

Excess Returns (at year t-1)
S&P 500

0.0814

0.6379

S&P 500

0.0814

0.6379

CRSP Value-weighted

0.0743

0.6387

CRSP Equal-weighted

0.0775

0.6391

Difference

0.0071

Difference

0.0039

p-value

0.339

p-value

0.600

t-statistics

0.9567

t-statistics

0.5309

79

Panel C: Correlation
Correlation
Excess Returns (at year t)
SP 500 ~ CRSP Value-weighted

0.9999

SP 500 ~ CRSP Equal-weighted

0.9992

Excess Returns (at year t-1)
SP 500 ~ CRSP Value-weighted

0.9999

SP 500 ~ CRSP Equal-weighted

0.9991
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Table 3-6 Robustness Test – Probit Regression
Panel A: Internal/External Replacement
SAL

SAL

EBC

EBC

TDC

TDC

Constant

0.3784
0.125

0.2842
0.187

0.704***
0.004

0.219
0.305

0.8304***
0.000

0.1838
0.396

Heterogeneity Index

-0.2305
0.720

---

-0.9425***
0.000

---

-1.6805***
0.000

---

---

0.088
0.229

---

0.2879***
0.000

---

0.2599***
0.000

Pay Gap

-0.1331***
0.000

-0.1301***
0.000

-0.1166***
0.001

-0.1226***
0.000

-0.1092***
0.002

-0.1226***
0.000

Duality

-0.2167***
0.003

-0.2202***
0.003

-0.183**
0.021

-0.2033***
0.006

-0.2013***
0.006

-0.2089***
0.004

-0.3845*
0.092

-0.3837*
0.093

-0.3722
0.138

-0.3398
0.138

-0.4308*
0.061

-0.3596
0.116

Board Size

0.0748***
0.000

0.0742***
0.000

0.0772***
0.000

0.0747***
0.000

0.0699***
0.000

0.0722***
0.000

Firm Size

0.0454
0.103

0.0465*
0.095

0.0369
0.229

0.0331
0.239

0.0473*
0.092

0.0483*
0.085

0.5396***
0.007

0.5386***
0.007

0.5708***
0.005

0.5539***
0.005

0.5816***
0.004

0.5688***
0.005

Leverage

0.2371
0.283

0.2369
0.283

0.2773
0.249

0.2727
0.218

0.2088
0.347

0.2167
0.328

R-Square

0.055

0.0558

0.0795

0.0643

0.0697

0.0626

# Observations

1,663

1,663

831

831

1,663

1,663

SIMILAR

Percentage Outsiders

Prior Performance

Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.
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Panel B: Turnover/No Turnover
SAL

SAL

EBC

EBC

TDC

TDC

Constant

-1.4092***
0.000

-1.3398***
0.000

-1.64***
0.000

-1.6349***
0.000

-1.3784***
0.000

-1.3797***
0.000

SIMILAR

0.3818***
0.000

0.371***
0.000

0.1222***
0.007

0.1106**
0.015

0.166***
0.000

0.1672***
0.000

---

-0.1322**
0.032

---

-0.2096**
0.013

---

-0.0343
0.579

0.0058
0.798

0.0052
0.823

-0.0289
0.441

-0.0289
0.443

-0.0058
0.819

-0.0059
0.814

Excess Return (time t-1)

-0.1671***
0.000

-0.084
0.122

-0.1191***
0.003

-0.2481***
0.000

-0.1935***
0.000

-0.1769***
0.000

Pay Gap

0.0745***
0.000

-0.0071
0.770

0.1637***
0.000

0.1636***
0.000

0.1486***
0.000

0.1483***
0.000

Duality

-0.6954***
0.000

-0.6916***
0.000

-0.7318***
0.000

-0.7343***
0.000

-0.6886***
0.000

-0.6885***
0.000

0.2032**
0.016

0.2179***
0.009

0.0732
0.544

0.0796
0.509

0.183**
0.028

0.1832**
0.028

Board Size

0.0047
0.431

0.005
0.399

0.0045
0.571

0.0048
0.549

0.0101*
0.088

0.0101*
0.089

Firm Size

0.0178*
0.093

0.0183*
0.084

0.0372***
0.010

0.0366**
0.011

0.0098
0.353

0.0099
0.347

Leverage

0.0975
0.255

0.1098
0.199

0.1286
0.283

0.1301
0.278

0.0968
0.254

0.0967
0.255

R-Square

0.079

0.0776

0.0727

0.0738

0.0704

0.0704

# Observations

14,569

14,569

8,853

8,853

14,596

14,596

Excess Return (time t-1) *
SIMILAR
Excess Return (time t)

Percentage Outsiders

Note: ***, **, & * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, & 10% levels, respectively.
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION
With a sample of 347 S&P 500 firms, I find that firm governance in general improves
after being added to the index. Using a one-sample proportions test, I find that all mechanisms
(except management ownership and blockholders’ ownership) exhibit statistically significant
improvements. I also find that the market reacts positively to governance improvements. In
addition, improvements in governance are positively related to operating performance
improvement.
Using a novel measure of the competitiveness within the internal labor market, I find that
the probability of an internal replacement is higher in a more competitive internal labor market.
In addition, the increase in compensation is positively related to the competitiveness of the
internal labor market. Both results provide some support for tournament theory. The negative
relation between prior performance and probability of a turnover is also found. In addition, this
negative performance-turnover relationship is magnified by a more competitive internal labor
market.
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